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JUSTICE FOR JUDGES: THE ROADBLOCKS ON
THE PATH TO JUDICIAL COMPENSATION
REFORM
Kristen A. Holt+
In 2005, Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. warned that "[o]ur system
of justice suffers as the real salary of judges continues to decline," noting
that "[i]f Congress gave judges a raise of 30 percent tomorrow, judges
would-after adjusting for inflation-be making about what judges made
in 1969. "1 As purchasing power dwindles,2 judges steadily leave the
bench, often to enter private practice . Between 1990 and 2005, "92
judges ... left the bench" and "[flifty-nine of them stepped down to enter
the private practice of law.",4 These developments are disturbing in light
of dramatically increasing federal caseloads and constantly rising costs of
living.
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the United States Supreme Court, for his considerable insights, Robert C. Mueller for his
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encouragement. The author also wishes to thank the Catholic University Law Review for
its excellent editorial assistance. Finally, the author wishes to thank Andy Holt, and
Larry, Susan, and Michelle Penix for their patience and support.
1. JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., 2005 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY
5 (2006), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2005year-
endreport.pdf. Chief Justice Roberts carries on the call for reform of former Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist, who stated in 2003 that judicial compensation is "the most pressing
issue facing the judiciary today." Edward Walsh, Federal Judicial Pay Called Too Low,
WASH. POST, May 29, 2003, at A23 (quoting former Chief Justice Rehnquist). While the
state of the federal judiciary is often the focus of the judicial compensation reform debate,
magistrate judges, bankruptcy judges, Article I judges, and administrative law judges also
are affected by changes in federal judicial compensation reform. Id. at 4 n.13.
2. AM. BAR ASS'N & FED. BAR ASS'N, FEDERAL JUDICIAL PAY 12 (2003),
available at http://www.abanet.org/poladv/fedcomp2003.pdf. From 1969 to 2002, circuit
and district court judges lost 23.5% of their purchasing power, while Supreme Court
Justices suffered a 37.3% loss. Id.
3. Id. at 21.
4. ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 4.
5. AM. BAR ASS'N & FED. BAR ASS'N, supra note 2, at 13 & chart D, 18-19 (noting
that from 1969 to 2002, the cost of purchasing a home increased 42% and financing a
college education increased by 126.3%, and that during the same period the criminal and
civil case loads more than tripled from 110,778 to 341,841). Additionally, as of 2005, "[t]he
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts reported ...that overall case filings in the
federal appellate and trial courts climbed in fiscal year 2004, adding up to a double digit
percentage increase in workload for the Judiciary since 1995." News Release, Admin.
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Are these the early warning signs of a crisis in the federal judiciary?
The Framers of the United States Constitution set out to create an
independent judicial branch insulated from dangerous political
maneuvering that could affect judges' impartiality while serving on the
bench.6 Through the Constitution's Compensation Clause, salaries are
guaranteed to all Article III judges, "which shall not be diminished
during their Continuance in Office."7
This Comment addresses why available legal and political mechanisms
have been largely ineffective in adjusting judicial compensation for over
thirty years and why judicial salary deflation is a critically important
public issue rather than simply a concern for those sitting on the bench.
This Comment also addresses the downward trend in compensation for
members of the judiciary for more than three decades and the failure of
the legislative and judicial branches to implement a successful remedy.
To introduce current issues related to decreasing judicial compensation,
this Comment first discusses the fundamental constitutional principle of
undiminished judicial compensation, bolstered by deliberations of the
Framers of our Constitution. Next, this Comment discusses a series of
cases and statutes addressing issues implicated by the Compensation
Clause, including the continued implementation and ultimate elimination
of judicial cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs). This Comment then
acknowledges that ideal reforms would include the decoupling of the
decision to grant COLAs to the legislative and judicial branches, as well
as an across-the-board increase in judicial salaries, but concludes that
such reforms are not politically feasible. This Comment ultimately
proposes alternative, more politically neutral solutions, including
guaranteed retirement benefits and locality pay adjustments.
Office of the U.S. Courts, Filings Climbed in Federal Courts in Fiscal Year 2004, at 1
(Mar. 15, 2005) (on file with the Catholic University Law Review).
Similarly, Justice Breyer asserted that "[t]o permit that kind of pay decrease-
particularly when during the same period the pay of the average American has increased
and when key costs, such as those of higher education, have skyrocketed-creates major
financial insecurity among judges." Statements to the National Commission on the Public
Service: Statements of Justice Stephen G. Breyer 6 (July 15, 2002) (transcript available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/ncps-project.pdf).
Recent statistics further support Justice Breyer's statements. In 2004 "[tlhe average
tuition for undergrads attending four-year public universities jumped 10.5 percent."
Jeanne Sahadi, College Costs Spike Again: Tuition Climbs Fastest at Public Schools, While
Aid Helps Lower-Income Students Less, Study Finds, CNNMONEY.COM, Oct. 19, 2004,
http://money.cnn.com/2004/10/18/pf/college/college-costs/index.htm?cnn+yes.
6. See infra Part I.B.
7. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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I. TENSION BETWEEN JUDICIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE COMPENSATION CLAUSE
A. The Current State of the Judiciary
For over thirty years, judicial compensation has been inherently
unreliable." Inflation has decreased judges' purchasing power and ability
to maintain a constant standard of living.9 Judges have increasingly
experienced unnecessary political maneuvering by the creation and later
withdrawal of COLAs, resulting in the diminution of their total
incomes.0 Members of the judiciary assert that this financial uncertainty
directly relates to a steady stream of attrition from the bench.1'
The loss of judges is having a deleterious impact on the fabric of our
judiciary. 2 As qualified and experienced judges leave, current judges
overextend themselves to bear an increasing number of complex cases
until replacements are found.'3 As a result, not only is there a problem of
retention, but there is a decreasing pool of capable individuals willing to
be considered for judgeships. 4 Moreover, concerns exist regarding the
number of applicants for federal judgeships, as well as the quality of
those individuals. 5 Ideally, the bench should be comprised of a group of
8. See AM. BAR ASS'N & FED. BAR ASS'N, supra note 2, at 12-13.
9. Id. at 12-13, 21.
10. See infra Part II.D.
11. AM. BAR ASS'N & FED. BAR ASS'N, supra note 2, at 27-28.
12. Id. at 1-2.
13. See id. at 20-22. The number of senior government officials that are eligible for
retirement by 2008 compounds this problem. Id. at 1 n.l. The Volcker Commission,
which "was established to examine ways to restore and renew government service," id. at
2, found that "the best estimates are that by the end of this decade, the federal
government will have suffered one of the greatest drains of experienced personnel in its
history." NAT'L COMM'N ON THE PUB. SERV., URGENT BUSINESS FOR AMERICA:
REVITALIZING THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 8 (2003), available
at http://www.brookings.edu/gscps/volcker/reportfinal.pdf.
14. AM. BAR Ass'N & FED. BAR Ass'N, supra note 2, at 22-23. Former Chief Justice
Rehnquist has also commented on retention issues recounting that some judges are
leaving because the "sense of inequity" surrounding Congress' failure to provide
consistent COLAs. William H. Rehnquist, Statement of William H. Rehnquist, Chief
Justice of the United States Before the National Commission on the Public Service (July
15, 2002) (transcript available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp
_07-15-02.html). His statement includes a quote from a former magistrate judge who said,
"'[ajlthough I did not enter public service with any thought of becoming wealthy, I did
enter with the hope that I would be treated fairly."' Id. The former Chief Justice also
noted that "[d]iminishing judicial salaries affects not only those who have become judges,
but also the pool of those willing to be considered for a position on the federal bench." Id.
15. See Rehnquist, supra note 14. The former Chief Justice commented that "[o]ur
judges will not continue to represent the diverse face of America if only the well-to-do or
mediocre are willing to become judges." Id.; see also Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional
Law of Official Compensation, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 501, 535 (2002) ("The constitutional
2006]
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racially, ethnically, and culturally diverse individuals that are
academically and intellectually well-qualified, and representative of the
diverse population who will seek justice in their courtrooms. 16 The fiscal
reality of current judicial compensation threatens this diversity because
only economically well-situated lawyers can afford to accept an
appointment as a federal judge.17
In addition to inflationary erosion and inconsistent COLA
disbursements, judicial salaries remain well below those in the private
rules [governing judicial compensation] affect the composition of the pool of lawyers from
which candidates for federal judicial service are drawn, because possible candidates know
the rules and select in or out of the pool according to the relative costs and benefits of
judicial service and private sector opportunities.").
16. See Rehnquist, supra note 14.
17. See id. (noting that "[w]e cannot afford a Judiciary made up primarily of the
wealthy or the inexperienced"). The former Chief Justice's concerns echoed those of
Alexander Hamilton, who warned that "no man can be sure that he may not be tomorrow
the victim of a spirit of injustice, by which he may be a gainer to-day." THE FEDERALIST
No. 78, at 398 (Alexander Hamilton) (Garry Wills ed., 1982). One lawyer asserted that
raising judicial salaries may actually help the judiciary become more diversified, asserting
that "'[a] greater representation of their less corporate perspectives on the bench might be
healthy for the federal judicial system."' Jim Geraghty, Federal Judges: Are We Getting
What We Pay For?, SPEAKOUT.COM, Feb. 19, 2001, http://speakout.com/activism/news/
5645-1.html (quoting Mark Scherzer).
Others express concern that by asking for higher salaries, the general public may lose
esteem for the judiciary. Id. One lawyer explained that "'[t]he pay is still far more than
what the median American family earns, and the job offers life tenure. Those who would
trade serving justice for the continuing pursuit of lottery-like incomes do not value justice
richly enough, and are therefore unsuited for the job."' Id. (quoting Jonathan M.
Freiman).
Adding a social science perspective, Professor Albert Yoon provided a statistical
analysis of the claims that judicial attrition results from inferior compensation. Albert
Yoon, Love's Labor Lost? Judicial Tenure Among Federal Court Judges: 1945-2000, 91
CAL. L. REV. 1029, 1030 (2003). Using time-series regression analysis, Professor Yoon
considered whether or not judges are leaving the bench at a higher rate than in the past,
and whether such attrition is related to salary considerations. Id. A linear regression is
the
equation that describes the true relationship between the dependent variable Y
and the independent variable X.
In an effort to reach a decision regarding the likely form of this relationship,
the researcher draws a sample from the population of interest and using the
resulting data, computes a sample regression equation that forms the basis for
reaching conclusions regarding the unknown population regression equation.
WAYNE W. DANIEL, BIOSTATISTICS: A FOUNDATION FOR ANALYSIS IN THE HEALTH
SCIENCES 404 (7th ed. 1999). Professor Yoon's research suggests that judges are not
actually leaving the bench at higher rates due to today's financial realities. Yoon, supra, at
1030.
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sector and academia.18 As of 2006, judges' salaries ranged from $165,200
for Federal District Court Judges, to $212,100 for the Chief Justice of the
United States.' 9 In comparison, large law firms in several metropolitan
areas pay first-year associates $125,000, plus bonuses.2 And as an
alternative comparison, deans of the top twenty-five ranked law schools
reported an average salary of $301,639 for the 2003 school year.2 '
But to fully understand the judicial compensation picture, one must
consider more than salary. Judges receive considerable retirement
benefits for life, as long as they satisfy a years of service and age
requirement, commonly called the "Rule of 80. ",22 This rule permits a
judge to retire at age sixty-five or later when the judge's age and years of
23judicial service total eighty. Upon retirement, a judge continues to
receive his or her current salary for life. 24  As an alternative to full
retirement, a judge may take "senior status," remaining on the bench but
retaining a smaller caseload.25 But, the Rule of 80 is an "'all or nothing'
18. AM. BAR Ass'N & FED. BAR ASS'N, supra note 2, at ii. Compare id. at 3 (listing
the current federal judicial salaries), with Walsh, supra note 1 (stating partner and first-
year associate compensation at major law firms).
19. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL SALARIES SINCE 1968 (2006),
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/salarychart.pdf. Additionally, Federal Circuit Court
Judges presently earn $175,100, and Associate Justices earn $203,000. Id. Members of
Congress receive the same compensation as Federal District Court Judges: $165,200. Id.
20. The NLJ 250, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 18,2002, at C3, C4.
21. NAT'L COMM'N ON THE PUB. SERV., supra note 13, at 23, 35 n.10.
22. AM. BAR Ass'N & FED. BAR ASS'N, supra note 2, at 16 n.49. The "Rule of 80"
provides that
Any justice or judge of the United States appointed to hold office during
good behavior may retire from the office after attaining the age and meeting the
service requirements, whether continuous or otherwise, of subsection (c) and
shall, during the remainder of his lifetime, receive an annuity equal to the salary
he was receiving at the time he retired.
28 U.S.C. § 371(a) (2000). Furthermore,
[b]eginning at age 65, a judge may retire at his or her current salary . . .after
performing 15 years of active service as an Article III judge (65+15 = 80). A
sliding scale of increasing age and decreasing service results in eligibility for
retirement compensation at age 70 with a minimum of 10 years of service (70+10
= 80).
Federal Judiciary Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.uscourts.gov/faq.html (last
visited Feb. 12, 2006); see also 28 U.S.C. § 371(c).
23. 28 U.S.C. § 371(a), (c).
24. Id. § 371(a).
25. Id. § 371(b), (e). The statute explains the option of taking on senior status as
opposed to full retirement:
Any justice or judge of the United States appointed to hold office during good
behavior may retain the office but retire from regular active service after
attaining the age and meeting the service requirements, whether continuous or
otherwise, of subsection (c) of this section and shall, during the remainder of his
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proposition"; if a judge leaves the bench before satisfying the Rule of 80,
the judge forfeits all retirement pay.2 6
In addition to receiving full pay for life, judges may also prepare for
retirement through participation in the government's Thrift Savings Plan,
(TSP) which is similar to a private sector 401K plan.27 The TSP allows all
federal employees to contribute as much as fifteen percent of their
income per pay period, up to a maximum dollar amount specified by the
IRS.28 However, unlike many civilian employees, federal judges do not
receive a matching contribution from the government.
29
While a generous retirement system exists, it does not solve the cash
flow problem for younger judges.30 As part of the available remedy for
this short-term cash flow problem, judges are permitted to earn
additional income through, for example, teaching courses at law schools,
in compliance with the honoraria restrictions of The Ethics in
or her lifetime, continue to receive the salary of the office if he or she meets the
requirements of subsection (e).
Id. § 371(b)(l). Judges with senior status "who essentially provide volunteer service to the
courts, typically handle about 15 percent of the federal courts' workload annually."
Federal Judiciary Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.uscourts.gov/faq.html (last
visited Feb. 12, 2006).
26. AM. BAR ASS'N & FED. BAR ASS'N, supra note 2, at 16 n.49; see also 28 U.S.C. §
371(a), (b)(1). Additionally, it is important to consider that judges' retirement benefits are
not a pension. Joe Mandak, Greener Pastures Lure Some Judges, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS,
Feb. 19, 2004, at A30. While judges continue to receive full pay for life, "because [the pay
is] not a pension, their dependents lose that income when the judges die." Id. To
compensate, many judges buy additional life insurance. Id.
27. TSP Features for Civilians, chapter 1, http://www.tsp.gov/features/chapter01.html
(last visited Feb. 12, 2006). The TSP is a "retirement savings and investment plan" that
offers federal employees similar savings and tax incentives as are offered to private sector
employees via 401K plans. ld; see also I.R.C. § 7701(j)(1)(A) (2000) ("[T]he [TSP] shall
be treated as a trust described in [I.R.C. §] 401(a) which is exempt from taxation under 26
U.S.C. Subsection 501(a)."). "TSP regulations are published in title 5 of the Code of
Federal Regulations, Parts 1600-1690, and are periodically supplemented and amended in
the Federal Register." TSP Features for Civilians, supra.
28. TSP Features for Civilians, supra note 27. As of 2006, I.R.C. § 402(g) set
maximum "Elective Deferral Limit[s]" at $15,000 per year. TSP's Current Information,
http://www.tsp.gov/curinfo/data.html (last updated Feb. 2, 2006).
29. See TSP Features for Civilians, chapter 4, http://www.tsp.gov/features/chapter04.
html (last visited Feb. 12, 2005). While a broader range of civilian government employees
may participate in the TSP program, only Federal Employees' Retirement System (FERS)
employees are "entitled to receive agency contributions" as part of their employee
benefits program. Id. Federal judges are excluded from FERS and therefore do not
receive such contributions. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, COMPARING THE PAY AND
BENEFITS OF FEDERAL AND NONFEDERAL EXECUTIVES 5 (1999), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/17xx/doc1763/execpay.pdf.
30. AM. BAR ASS'N & FED. BAR ASS'N, supra note 2, at 12-15.
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Government Act of 1989.' Also, when judges file annual Financial
Disclosure Reports, they report non-investment income as net income,
not gross income. 2 This permits judges to deduct significant necessary
expenses, such as travel, thereby complying with the maximum net
income limitations of the Ethics in Government Act.33
In addition to the purely fiscal benefits, judges receive "psychic
income" that can substantially add to quality of life and job satisfaction.34
Indeed, "[f]or [many] judges . . . rendering public service in a highly
visible and respected role and serving in a lifetime appointment are
intangible benefits that help compensate for the reduced salary levels
associated with the bench.
35
Yet, these facets of compensation do not offer a complete picture of
the current state of the judiciary. Anecdotal evidence suggests that part
of the judicial compensation gridlock problem relates to a basic political
36
reality. Members of Congress must run for reelection every two or six
years and, therefore, are continually fundraising and campaigning.37 In
contrast, federal judges receive lifetime appointments and a generous
retirement package.3 ' Therefore, members of Congress may hesitate to
approve any judicial compensation plan, whether temporary or long-
term, to increase judicial salaries to a level above their own.39 This
political reality may call for more creative solutions to the judicial
compensation dilemma.
B. The Compensation Clause and the Intent of the Framers
Article III, Section 1 of the United States Constitution establishes that
"[t]he Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their
Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for
their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during
31. 5 U.S.C. app. § 502(b) (2000). Government employees not paid per the General
Schedule may not earn income in excess of fifteen percent of annual salary in a calendar
year. Id. § 501(a).
32. COMM. ON FIN. DISCLOSURE, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FILING
INSTRUCTIONS FOR JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES 17 (2004).
33. See id.
34. AM. BAR Ass'N & FED. BAR ASS'N, supra note 2, at 15-16.
35. Id. at 16.
36. See Paul C. Light, Democracy on the Cheap, GOV'T EXECUTIVE, June 2002, at 86,
86.
37. See, e.g., Cameron W. Barr, Mikulski Is Victor for a 4th Term, WASH. POST, Nov.
3,2004, at A30.
38. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; 28 U.S.C. § 371(b)-(c) (2000).
39. See generally Light, supra note 36, at 86 (describing Congress' propensity to deny
salary increases to the judiciary).
20061
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their Continuance in Office., 40 In drafting this language, the Framers,
above all, set out to preserve "complete independence of the courts of
justice., 41 Alexander Hamilton emphasized the proper balance of power
between the legislative and judicial branches of government, stating that
"[i]n the general course of human nature, a power over a man's
subsistence amounts to a power over his will. '42 For example, Hamilton
40. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
41. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 17, at 394. The
earliest legislative effort to preserve judicial independence, the Act of Settlement in 1701,
an English law, sought to remedy the abuses of the Stuart Kings, providing that "'Judges
Commissions be made Quamdiu se bene gesserint [during good behavior], and their
Salaries ascertained and established."' United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 218 (1980)
(alterations in original) (quoting 1701, 12 & 13 Will. III, c. 2, § III, cl. 7 (Eng.)); see also
Archibald Cox, The Independence of the Judiciary: History and Purposes, 21 U. DAYTON
L. REV. 565, 569-70 & 570 n.12 (1996).
Despite these protections, "the King converted the tenure of colonial judges to service
at his pleasure" in 1761. Will, 449 U.S. at 219. As a result, "[s]ubjecting colonial judges to
the whims and caprices of the King was one of the royal abuses cited in the Declaration of
Independence, which denounced the King for making '[j]udges dependent on his Will
alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries."'
Brief Amicus Curiae of the American College of Trial Lawyers in Support of Petitioners
at 4, Williams v. United States, 535 U.S. 911 (2002) (No. 01-175) (quoting THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 10-11 (U.S. 1776)).
42. THE FEDERALIST No. 79 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 17, at 400. Hamilton
further expounded on the idea of judicial independence by explaining that "we can never
hope to see realised in practice the complete separation of the judicial from the legislative
power, in any system, which leaves the former dependent for pecuniary resources on the
occasional grants of the latter." Id.
There is also evidence to suggest that the Framers drew on their own colonial
experiences when considering the protections that should be provided to the judiciary. See
Brief Amicus Curiae of the American College of Trial Lawyers in Support of Petitioners,
supra note 41, at 4-5. For example, according to one commentator,
the judiciary in many states was made subservient to the state legislature ...
Judicial appointments and terms of service were controlled by legislatures, as were
salaries and fees. State legislatures regularly overturned judicial findings and often
took over traditional judicial duties such as rulings on probate, debt, and even
marriage and divorce.
Id. at 5 (alteration in original) (quoting THE FEDERALIST at 22 (Isaac Kramnick) (Isaac
Kramnick ed., 1987)). There is also evidence that the Framers sought to promote an
independent judiciary to preserve the Union after the Revolutionary War. JACK N.
RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS 290 (1996). According to one scholar:
It took a decade of experience under the state constitutions to expose the triple
danger that so alarmed Madison in 1787: first, that the abuse of the legislative
power was more ominous than arbitrary acts of the executive; second, that the
true problem of rights was less to protect the ruled from their rulers than to
defend minorities and individuals against factious popular majorities acting
through government; and third, that agencies of central government were less
dangerous than state and local despotisms.
Id. Armed with this knowledge, the Framers established more stringent protections for
judicial independence than found in the British system. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the
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asserted that in order to specifically protect the vulnerability of the
judiciary, "[n]ext to permanency in office, nothing can contribute more
to the independence of the judges, than a fixed provision for their
support., 43  Thus, the Framers acknowledged the importance of an
independent judiciary in the structure of the United States Government
while further recognizing that in order to preserve judicial independence,
it would be imperative to preserve a secure means of financial support
for judges.44
Additionally, the Framers considered drafting the Compensation
Clause in such a way as to prevent any increase or decrease in judicial
compensation by the legislature, as evidenced by James Madison's notes
during the Constitutional Convention.45  Madison's observation that
"judges would be inclined to defer to Congress" demonstrates his
perception that judges may find themselves at the mercy of Congress to
provide any upward adjustment in pay.46 Despite this possibility, the
American College of Trial Lawyers in Support of Petitioners, supra note 41, at 5. For
example, the delegates to the Constitutional Convention "rejected a proposal by John
Dickinson of Pennsylvania to allow the removal of judges by a joint address of Congress."
id.
43. THE FEDERALIST No. 79 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 17, at 400. While
under British rule, judges received compensation at the pleasure of the Crown; this
absence of judicial independence was rebuked in the Declaration of Independence, "[the
King] has made Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the
amount and payment of their salaries." THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 11
(U.S. 1776); see also WILLIAM S. CARPENTER, JUDICIAL TENURE IN THE UNITED
STATES 2-3 (1918); Breyer, supra note 5 (noting that the Framers' grievances over judicial
independence are reflected in the Declaration of Independence).
44. THE FEDERALIST No. 79 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 17, at 400-01. The
Framers also considered several other methodologies to effectuate and establish judicial
independence. The Framers rejected a fixed compensation rate, because the "fluctuations
in the value of money, and in the state of society, rendered a fixed rate of compensation in
the constitution inadmissible." Id. at 400 (explaining that salaries are not capped because
"[w]hat might be extravagant to-day, might in half a century become penurious and
inadequate"). Similarly, Madison considered linking judicial salaries with a highly valued
commodity, such as wheat, in order to adjust for "[t]he variations in the value of money."
2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 45 (Max Farrand ed., rev.
ed. 1966). This notion of linking judicial salaries to a commodity to adjust for inflationary
fluctuations affecting the value of money demonstrates an early understanding of the
potential need for some kind of automatic cost of living increase. Cf. LAWRENCE HENRY
GIPSON, THE COMING OF THE REVOLUTION, 1763-1775, at 46-54 (Henry Steele
Commager & Richard B. Morris eds., 1954). But Madison's concept of linking
compensation to a commodity was ultimately rejected for fear that the cited commodity
may change in value over time. Will, 449 U.S. at 220. The idea may also have been
eliminated from consideration because of the recent failure of a similar plan in Virginia,
linking the salary of clergy to a commodity. Id. at 220 n.22.
45. Will, 449 U.S. at 219.
46. Williams v. United States, 48 F. Supp. 2d 52, 55-56 (D.D.C. 1999), rev'd, 240 F.3d
1019 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Chief Justice Roberts noted this same dilemma, stating that
2006]
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Framers decided to "leave it to the discretion of the legislature to vary its
provisions in conformity to the variations in circumstances., 47 While this
decision gives Congress the power to set judicial compensation,
Hamilton carefully explained that once compensation is set, the
Compensation Clause "put[s] it out of the power of that body to change
the condition of the individual for the worse., 41 Under this system, each
judge could "be sure of the ground upon which he stands, and ... never
be deterred from his duty by the apprehension of being placed in a less
eligible situation.
'49
C. Stage I: Revising Government Salaries and the Introduction of COLAs
Almost two hundred years later, similar issues surrounding the
Compensation Clause arose when Congress, seeking a general overhaul
of government salaries, 0 enacted the Postal Revenue and Federal Salary
"[u]nfortunately, judges do not have a natural constituency to argue on their behalf. They
do not serve a particular group, and courts-by their very design-often have to render
unpopular decisions. Judges must rely on the Congress and the President to increase their
pay." ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 5.
47. THE FEDERALIST No. 79 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 17, at 400. The
Framers also considered the different terms of office between the President and federal
judges when determining different methods of compensation. Id. at 401. Hamilton
explained that because the President is "elected for no more than four years, it can rarely
happen that an adequate salary, fixed at the commencement of that period, will not
continue to be such to the end of it." Id. Hamilton compared this to judges where, "it
may well happen, especially in the early stages of the government, that a stipend, which
would be very sufficient at their first appointment, would become too small in the progress
of their service." Id.
48. Id. at 400. Moreover,
[11n framing the Constitution... the power to diminish the compensation of
the federal judges was explicitly denied, in order ... that their judgment or action
might never be swayed in the slightest degree by the temptation to cultivate the
favor or avoid the displeasure of that department which, as master of the purse,
would otherwise hold the power to reduce their means of support.
O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 531 (1933).
49. THE FEDERALIST No. 79 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 17, at 401. As
observed by Alexander Hamilton, because the judiciary has "no influence over either the
sword or the purse," it has "neither Force nor Will, but merely judgment." THE
FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 17, at 393-94.
50. See infra text accompanying notes 51-55. In addition, the Supreme Court decided
several judicial compensation cases beginning in 1920. Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920),
first established that Congress could not discriminate against the judiciary through
compensation diminutions in the form of taxes. Id. at 264. In Evans, the Court held that a
federal income tax enacted after the petitioning judge joined the bench was
unconstitutional under the Compensation Clause. Id. at 246-47, 263-64. In Miles v.
Graham, 268 U.S. 501 (1925), "[t]he Court subsequently extended the holding of Evans to
all federal taxes, whether enacted before or after a judge was appointed." See Brief
Amicus Curiae of the American College of Trial Lawyers in Support of Petitioners, supra
note 41, at 11. Miles was highly criticized and was ultimately overruled by O'Malley v.
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Act of 1967."' Then, to strengthen the Postal Revenue and Federal
Salary Act, Congress passed the Executive Salary Cost-of-Living
Adjustment Act in 1975,52 which adjusted salaries for inflation.53  The
Executive Salary Cost-of-Living Adjustment Act provided high-level
executive employees, members of Congress, and judges with automatic
annual COLAs unless expressly rejected by Congress.54 Yet, in practice,
these two acts did not provide a stable, recurring assessment of judicial
salaries." Instead, Congress frequently rejected its own COLA increases,
as well as COLA adjustments for top executive members and the
56judiciary.
In 1980, a group of judges filed suit in United States v. Will,57 thereby
affording the Supreme Court the opportunity to address whether
Congress' actions to alter statutorily mandated COLA increases violated
the Compensation Clause. 5" The Supreme Court reinstated the COLAs
Woodrough, 307 U.S. 277 (1939), where the Court held that "[t]o subject [judges] to a
general tax is merely to recognize that judges are also citizens, and that their particular
function in government does not generate an immunity from sharing with their fellow
citizens the material burden of the government whose Constitution and laws they are
charged with administering." Id. at 282.
After O'Malley, judicial compensation reform did not resurface until the 1960s, when
"[t]he growth in [federal] budget outlays accelerated with the advent of the Great Society-
the poverty and middle class entitlement programs of the 1960s." Annelise Anderson,
Bringing Accountability to the Budget Process (June 23, 1995), http://www.
stanford.edu/-andrsn/dallas.html.
51. Pub. L. No. 90-206, § 225, 81 Stat. 613, 642-45 (2000) (establishing a Commission
on Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Salaries to conduct a review, set to begin in 1969, to
compare salaries for top executive, legislative, and judicial positions with one another and
with the General Schedule).
The Commission "commonly referred to as the 'Quadrennial Commission,' . . . was
composed of private sector members appointed by the President, leaders of the Senate
and House of Representatives, and the Chief Justice of the United States." AM. BAR
Ass'N & FED BAR ASS'N, supra note 2, at 5; see also Pub. L. No. 90-206, § 225, 81 Stat. at
642. From 1968 through 1988, the Commission met every four years to make salary
recommendations and sent its recommendations to the President. AM. BAR ASS'N & FED
BAR ASS'N, supra note 2, at 5. When the President then made his recommendations to
Congress, they became law by default unless Congress expressly objected. Id.
52. Executive Salary Cost-of-Living Adjustment Act, Pub. L. No. 94-82, 89 Stat. 419
(1975) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 5, and 31 U.S.C.).
53. Id.
54. See id. (linking the COLAs for judges to any COLAs allotted to general federal
workers). The 1967 Federal Salary Act Quadrennial Commission review process also
operated in parallel with the newly-instituted COLAs. Postal Revenue and Federal Salary
Act of 1967, § 225, 81 Stat. at 642-45.
55. AM. BAR ASS'N & FED. BAR ASS'N, supra note 2, at 5-6.
56. Id. at 8.
57. 449 U.S. 200 (1980).
58. Id. at 202.
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for two of the four instances in which their denial was appealed. 9 The
Court held that denying judges these 1976 and 1979 pay adjustments
violated the Compensation Clause.6
The Court differentiated between the four instances by considering
when the judges' interests became vested.6' The Court explained "that a
salary increase 'vests' for purposes of the Compensation Clause only
when it takes effect as part of the compensation due and payable to
Article III judges., 62  Therefore each issue turned on whether the
congressional "blocking laws," intended to cancel out the COLA
adjustments, took effect before or after judges' interests vested. 63 The
Court's rationale for the vesting test was to prevent the judicial branch
from "command[ing] Congress to carry out an announced future intent
as to a decision the Constitution vests exclusively in the Congress."
6
1
In 1994, the District of Columbia Circuit Court reached the same result
where a COLA provision applied to members of Congress. In Boehner
v. Anderson,66 member of Congress John Boehner claimed that the
COLA provision of the 1989 Ethics Reform Act violated the Twenty-
67
seventh Amendment, which states that no law "varying compensation
for the services of the Senators and Representatives, shall take effect
until an election of Representatives shall have intervened."1 Here, the
59. Id. at 226, 229-30.
60. Id. at 226, 230. The Court clarified that "[tihe inclusion in the freeze of other
officials who are not protected by the Compensation Clause does not insulate a direct
diminution in judges' salaries from the clear mandate of that Clause; the Constitution
makes no exceptions for 'nondiscriminatory' reductions." Id. at 226.
61. Id. at 228-29.
62. Id. at 229; see also United States v. More, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 159, 167 (1805)
(holding that there was a violation of the Compensation Clause because the fee system in
dispute was already in place before Congress repealed it). Notably, the Will Court did not
specifically address the United States Court of Claims decision in Atkins v. United States,
556 F.2d 1028 (Ct. Cl. 1977), cert denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1978). In Atkins, the Court of
Claims held that "the Constitution affords no protection from such an indirect,
nondiscriminatory lowering of judicial compensation, not involving an assault upon the
independence of judges." Id. at 1051. Furthermore, "[b]y concluding that Congress could
constitutionally repeal a proposed cost-of-living increase that had not yet taken effect, the
Court indicated that the judicial Compensation Clause did not obligate Congress to
counter the effects of inflation on a regular basis." W. Parker Moore, Hoodwinked by
Hatter: Creating a Test for Constitutional Waivers of Sovereign Immunity to Pre-Judgment
Interest Awards, 27 VT. L. REV. 1061, 1078 (2003).
63. Will, 449 U.S. at 228-30.
64. Id. at 228; see also AM. BAR ASS'N & FED. BAR ASS'N, supra note 2, at 8
(discussing Congress' reaction to Will and subsequent controversy regarding COLAs).
65. See Boehner v. Anderson, 30 F.3d 156, 158, 163 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
66. 30 F.3d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
67. Id. at 158.
68. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVII.
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COLA took effect during the subsequent congressional term, and, thus,
the Supreme Court held that this was not a violation of the Twenty-
seventh Amendment.69
The struggle to maintain a fairly compensated judiciary continued
beyond the immediate aftermath of Will.70  To address lingering
problems with salary instability and attrition rates of high-level
government officials, Congress passed the Ethics Reform Act of 1989
(Ethics Act). The Ethics Act significantly altered the boundaries of
judicial compensation.73 The Ethics Act "revised the mechanism [for
providing COLAs to] judges, Members of Congress, and other high-level
officials" by treating all three as one group, meaning that if members of
Congress received the COLA, members of the judiciary and select
executive branch employees would receive the same increase at the same
time.74 These high-level government officials would now receive COLAs
in accordance with the increases afforded to general government71
employees through the Employment Cost Index (ECI). Moreover, the
69. Boehner, 30 F.3d at 163.
70. See discussion supra Parts II.C.-D.
71. AM. BAR ASS'N & FED. BAR Ass'N, supra note 2, at 9. The Bipartisan Task
Force on Ethics identified the failure to implement COLAs as "the single, most important
explanation for the growing disparity between top salaries in government and the private
sector, and the 38% loss of purchasing power by these officials since 1969." 135 CONG.
REC. H9265 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 1989) (statement of Rep. Martin).
72. Pub. L. No. 101-194, 103 Stat. 1716 (1989) (stating that the official purpose of the
act was "to amend the Rules of the House of Representatives and the Ethics in
Government Act of 1978 to provide for Government-wide ethics reform, and for other
purposes").
The purpose of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 was to "implement certain
reforms in the operation of the Federal Government and to preserve and promote the
integrity of public officials and institutions . . . .of the Federal Government and to
invigorate the Constitutional separation of powers between the three branches of
Government." S. REP. No. 95-170, at 1 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4216, 4217.
The Ethics in Government Act was largely reactionary to the Watergate scandal and its
cover-up. Stuart Taylor, Jr., U.S. Judge Orders a Special Inquiry into '80 Campaign, N.Y.
TIMES, May 15, 1984, at Al.
73. See supra text accompanying notes 60-63. Additionally, the Citizens' Commission
of Public Service and Compensation replaced the Quadrennial Commission as the
mechanism for continuing compensation evaluation. Ethics Reform Act of 1989, § 701,
103 Stat. at 1763-67. The Commission of Public Service and Compensation consisted of
eleven members. Id. § 701(b), 103 Stat. at 1763-64. The executive, legislative, and judicial
branches appointed six members. Id. Five members were selected from the general public
by using voter registration lists and the Administrator of the General Services
Administration facilitated the process. Id.
74. See AM. BAR ASS'N & FED. BAR ASS'N, supra note 2, at 9.
75. See 28 U.S.C. § 461(a) (2000) (noting, however, that any such Employment Cost
Index (ECI) adjustment cannot "exceed the percentage adjustment taking effect in such
calendar year under Section 5303 of Title 5 in the rates of pay under the General
Schedule").
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new methodology for assessing COLAs was to operate in conjunction
with General Schedule employee salary adjustments, unless the President
determined that severe economic circumstances precluded an allotment
of COLAs.76
Additionally, the Ethics Act significantly limited activities that
provided alternative sources of income to judges, including honoraria,
teaching, and writing.7 Judges could no longer receive payment for any
"appearance, speech or article. '.. However, judges could still earn
limited outside income by teaching law school courses, for example, as
long as those earnings did not exceed the specified annual threshold.79
Although the Ethics Act promised a more consistent methodology to
counter the effects of inflation on judicial salaries, the reality was quite
different . Judges received COLA increases only half of the time from
1993 to 2003, despite the ECI's indication to the contrary.8 Even though
judges did not receive these expected COLAs, the Ethics Act continued
to impose strict honoraria limitations.82 Moreover, the Commission of
Public Service and Compensation established by the Ethics Act never
became functional, nor were funds ever appropriated to operate the
Commission. 3  Therefore, the new Commission did not monitor
The ECI, established by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, is:
a measure of the change in the cost of labor, free from the influence of
employment shifts among occupations and industries. The compensation series
includes changes in wages and salaries and employer costs for employee benefits.
The wage and salary series and the benefit cost series provide the change for the
two components of compensation.
News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment Cost Index Explanatory Note,
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/eci.tn.htm (last modified Jan. 31, 2006).
76. See Ethics Reform Act of 1989, § 701(f), 103 Stat. at 1765.
77. 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 501-502 (2000); see also Heather M. Clark, Note, The Supreme
Court's Indecent Proposal: Repealing the Honoraria Prohibition of the Ethics in
Government Act of 1978, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1475, 1479 (2002) (discussing the
importance of the honoraria requirement to preserve the public's perception of integrity in
the judiciary).
78. 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 501(b), 505(3).
79. Id. § 501(a). Additionally, judges' transportation, food, and lodging expenses are
exempted from the prohibition on honoraria. See 31 U.S.C. § 1353(a) (2000). All outside
income may not exceed fifteen percent of the Executive Level II pay rate for that fiscal
year. COMM. ON FIN. DISCLOSURE, supra note 32, at 20.
80. See AM. BAR ASS'N & FED. BAR ASW'N, supra note 2, at 9-10.
81. Id.
82. See 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 501-502.
83. AM. BAR ASS'N & FED. BAR ASS'N, supra note 2, at 10 ("[T]here has been no
systematic review of the adequacy of Federal judicial salaries . since 1998, the date of
the last Quadrennial Commission.").
[Vol. 55:513
Justice for Judges
government employee salaries and did not offer recommendations for
reform, as was originally contemplated by the Act.8
D. Stage I]: Judicial Interpretations of the Compensation Clause:
Williams and Hatter
In Williams v. United States,85 ten years after codification of the Ethics
Act, a group of judges filed suit in the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia. 6 The judges argued that in 1995, 1996, 1997,
and 1999, congressional "blocking laws" canceled out the COLA
increases that the judges were intended to receive under the Ethics Act.
8 7
These judges argued that the blocking laws violated the Compensation
Clause because Congress was diminishing judicial salaries.
In 1999, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.8 9 On appeal, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that COLAs
established under the Ethics Act did not "vest" until the first day of the
applicable fiscal year, and, thus, Congress may lawfully deny COLA
adjustments as long as Congress passes the corresponding blocking
legislation prior to this key date.9 Therefore, the Williams court adopted
Will's narrow definition of "vesting," and left the door open for Congress
to revoke its past compensation increases to the judiciary as long as
84. See id. at 9-10.
85. 48 F. Supp. 2d 52 (D.D.C. 1999), rev'd, 240 F.3d 1019 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
86. Id. at 53.
87. Williams v. United States, 535 U.S. 911, 913 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
88. Id.
89. Williams, 48 F. Supp. 2d at 65. Williams is actually a consolidation of two cases,
one involving the denial of COLAs from 1995 to 1997, and the second a response to the
same COLA denial in 1999. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5-6, Williams, 535 U.S. 911
(No. 01-175). The two cases were consolidated when the government appealed the
declarations of summary judgment to the Federal Circuit. Id. at 6.
90. Williams, 240 F.3d at 1039-40. Further, the Federal Circuit held that this blocking
law, commonly referred to as Section 140, was no longer good law because it was only
intended to remain viable through the 1982 fiscal year. Id. at 1026-27.
The court in Williams also asserted that even if Section 140 was determined to be
permanent, binding legislation, it is preempted by the more recent legislation under the
Ethics Reform Act of 1989. Id. at 1027. The Court explained that
the 1989 Act was enacted after Section 140, and the 1989 Act, by providing a
specific process by which federal judges are to become eligible for COLAs, is
inconsistent with the general ban on pay increases established by Section 140.
Thus, should there be any disagreement that Section 140 died according to its
terms, the 1989 Act controls, rendering the government's reliance on Section 140
moot.
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Congress passed a blocking law before the amount was technically "due
and payable." 91
In response to the Federal Circuit's holding in Williams, plaintiffs filed
a motion for leave to file a second petition for rehearing in light of the
Supreme Court's recent holding in United States v. Hatter.92 In Hatter,
another group of judges asserted that the Compensation Clause
precluded the federal government from levying certain Social Security
and Medicare taxes on federal judges who were in office prior to
Congress' extension of a general tax on federal judges' salaries.93
Although the Court held that general Medicare taxes were
constitutionally applicable to judges, the Court also held that the Social
Security taxes "singl[ed] out judges for disadvantageous treatment" and,
therefore, violated the Compensation Clause.94 The Court noted that
such discrimination need not be the result of a conscious effort by
Congress to "intimidate, influence, or punish [judges]." 95  Instead, the
Court explained that "[i]f the Compensation Clause is to offer
meaningful protection .. we cannot limit that protection to instances in
91. Id. at 1039; see also United States v. More, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 159, 161-62 (1803)
(declaring a violation of the Compensation Clause because the fee system in dispute was
already in place before Congress repealed it); cf. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note
89, at 10 (arguing that "the Compensation Clause should be read broadly, in a way that
achieves its objectives").
92. 532 U.S. 557 (2001); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 89, at 8.
Additionally, the Williams decision spurred Congressional action to reenact the
controversial Section 140. Judiciary Appropriations Act, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-77, § 305,
115 Stat. 780, 783 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.A. § 461 note (West Supp. 2005)
(Salary Adjustments for Justices and Judges)). In the new version of the statute, Congress
included explicit language that the provision was permanent binding law. Id. This
language eliminated the previous debate over Section 140. See id.
93. Hatter, 532 U.S. at 564-65. Hatter overruled the Evans holding that the
Compensation Clause guards against any diminution of judicial salaries, including general
taxation. Id. at 567. The Court stated that "[w]e now overrule Evans insofar as it holds
that the Compensation Clause forbids Congress to apply a generally applicable,
nondiscriminatory tax to the salaries of federal judges, whether or not they were
appointed before enactment of the tax." Id. Therefore, the Hatter court ruled that the
Medicare taxes imposed were constitutionally viable because of their general nature. Id.
at 561.
94. Id. at 576. The Medicare taxes were held to be constitutional under the
Compensation Clause because taxes of a general nature apply to judges just like any other
citizen. Id. at 571-72. Similar reasoning was used earlier in O'Malley v. Woodrough, 307
U.S. 277 (1934), where the Court held that "[t]o subject [judges] to a general tax is merely
to recognize that judges are also citizens, and that their particular function in government
does not generate an immunity from sharing with their fellow citizens the material burden
of the government whose Constitution and laws they are charged with administering." Id.
at 282.
95. Hatter, 532 U.S. at 577.
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which the Legislature manifests ...direct hostility to the Judiciary. 9 6
Thus, Hatter offered an alternative means of analyzing Williams, focusing
on the discriminatory nature of the blocking laws rather than the time at
which the COLAs became "vested." 97
Meanwhile, Williams continued to work its way through the courts.
After the Federal Circuit denied a rehearing,98 plaintiffs petitioned the
Supreme Court for certiorari in 2001. 99 The petition was denied.'0 But
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Scalia and Kennedy, provided an
unusual, strongly worded dissent discussing the importance of hearing
Williams to resolve unsettled constitutional issues.01
The dissent asserted that the Court should hear Williams in order to
consider whether the Ethics Act contained precise language as to create
an "expectation" protected by the Compensation Clause. 12  Justice
Breyer further asserted that if "expectation" was part of the issue, then
96. Id.
97. Id. at 576-77. Yet there is significant criticism of Hatter. For example, Professor
Vermeule argues that the Court erred in Hatter by creating an antidiscrimation rule and
not following a stricter textual reading of the Compensation Clause. See Vermeule, supra
note 15, at 504. Professor Vermeule explains that
[t]he Compensation Clause is best understood strictly as a substantive rule, not
an antidiscrimination rule. The Court neither is nor can be serious about
policing substitutes for "direct" attacks on judicial compensation, and the ease
with which judges may manipulate the baseline against which discrimination is
measured entails that a nondiscrimination test both produces excessive scope for
judicial bias and hampers oversight by nonjudicial observers.
Id. Professor Vermeule further remarks that although judges can only block
unconstitutional legislative actions to diminish judicial salaries rather than independently
implementing salary increases, this only "diminishes ... the scope of judicial opportunities
to self-deal, not the severity of the resulting harms." Id. at 522. Professor Vermeule
acknowledges that political pressures may keep judges from self-dealing in extreme cases,
but asserts that "those pressures would not be thought sufficient to alleviate the duty of
recusal for a single judge with a direct financial stake in the case." Id. at 522-23.
98. Williams v. United States, 240 F.3d 1366, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
99. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 89, at 30.
100. Williams v. United States, 535 U.S. 911, 911 (2002). The Clerk of the Supreme
Court explains that one must exercise caution, however, when trying to interpret an
outcome based on voting to grant or deny certiorari. Interview with General William K.
Suter, Clerk, Supreme Court of the United States, in Wash., D.C. (Oct. 19, 2004). General
Suter noted that just because a Justice voted to grant or deny does not in any way establish
the way in which he or she would vote on the substantive issues. Id.
101. See Williams, 535 U.S. at 911 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 918. Justice Breyer explained that the issue in Williams may be framed as
"whether the 1989 statute is sufficiently precise and definite to have created an
'expectation' that the Compensation Clause protects." Id.
Petitioners' brief further argued that by allowing the lower court's decision to stand
"the majority has relegated the Judicial Branch to a permanent state of subservience and
dependence" which canceled out the "commendable effort by [the 101st] Congress" when
it codified the 1989 Ethics Reform Act. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 89, at 9.
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Will was not controlling, and the Court should grant certiorari to review
Williams.10 3 Justice Breyer also suggested that the denial of COLAs in
Williams may be constitutionally questionable based on its singular focus
on judges in light of the Court's 2001 holding in Hatter.'4
Additionally, the Williams dissent from denial of the petition for
certiorari directly addressed prudential concerns that may have affected
the Court's decision not to hear the case.0 5 Justice Breyer acknowledged
that hearing a case that could directly affect his own compensation gave
him pause."6 But he noted that under some circumstances, the Rule of
Necessity requires judges to decide cases where they admittedly have an
103. Williams, 535 U.S. at 918 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer further expands
upon his point that "expectation" was not considered in Will because
[t]o read that opinion as the lower court read it would render ineffectual any
congressional effort to protect judges' real compensation, even from the most
malignant hyperinflation . . . . Indeed, that reading would permit legislative
repeal of even the most precise and definite salary statute-any time before the
operative fiscal year in which the new nominal salary rate is to be paid. I very
much doubt that the Court in Will intended these consequences.
Id.
Moreover, petitioner's brief asserted that while Congress is generally free to rescind its
legislation, exceptions exist "where a right or entitlement has been created by the initial
enactment." Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 89, at 11-12 (citing United States v.
Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839 (1996)). Finally, Justice Breyer noted that Section 140 was
not controlling in Williams because it was not codified during the years in question.
Williams, 535 U.S. at 918-19 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
104. Williams, 535 U.S. at 918-19 (Breyer, J., dissenting). (Justice Breyer references
Hatter where the Court declared a Social Security tax on judicial salaries unconstitutional
under the Compensation Clause because the tax "'almost exclusively singled out federal
judges"'). Id. (quoting United States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 587, 564 (2001)).
105. Id. at 919.
106. Id. In his dissent, Justice Breyer admitted that the Supreme Court Justices "face
the serious embarrassment of deciding a matter that would directly affect our own
pocketbooks; and, in doing so, we may risk the public's high opinion of the Court insofar
as that opinion rests upon a belief that its judges are not self-interested." Id. Such
concerns arise whenever a branch of government is involved in setting its own
compensation. James Madison discussed this dilemma when he introduced "what would
become the Twenty-seventh Amendment." Vermeule, supra note 15, at 506. Quoting
Madison, Vermeule explained that "although political checks are largely sufficient to
prevent the grossest forms of legislative self-dealing through salaries, 'there is a seeming
impropriety in leaving any set of men without control to put their hand into the public
coffers, to take out money to put in their pockets."' Id. (quoting ANNALS OF CONG. 440
(Joseph Gales ed., 1834)). Thus, even if there is a political check in place, the risk remains
that public perception may be that of impropriety. Id. But Professor Vermeule warns that
even these political checks may not be present for the judicial branch, as they are for the
legislative, because federal judges are "indirectly elected official[s]" with life tenure, and
thus may be "removed from [significant] political oversight" as compared to the members
of Congress. Id.
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interest when "'no provision is made for calling another in, or where no
one else can take his place."' 7
The Williams dissent from the denial of the petition for certiorari
considered whether Congress could remedy any deficiency in judicial
compensation through the Ethics Act mandate "that real judicial salaries
will not fall significantly unless those of the typical American worker or
the typical civil servant decline significantly as well."'' s However, Justice
Breyer noted that Congress passed blocking laws "about half the time"
since the Ethics Act was enacted and that "real salaries of district court
judges have declined about 25 percent in the past several decades."'' 9
In addition to the three Justice dissent, several prominent
organizations filed amicus briefs in support of the Petitioner encouraging
the Supreme Court to hear the case. These included the American Bar
Association, twelve state and local bar associations, and the American
College of Trial Lawyers." ° The amicus briefs encouraged the Court to
107. Williams, 535 U.S. at 919 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Will,
449 U.S. 200, 214 (1980)) (explaining that sometimes judges must hear difficult cases when
no one means of attaining justice is available). Justice Breyer noted:
Nor shall judges, who are called upon to protect the least popular cause and the
least popular person where the Constitution demands it, be moved by potential
personal embarrassment. Whenever a court considers a matter where public
sentiment is strong, it risks public alienation. But the American public has
understood the need and the importance of judges deciding important
constitutional issues without regard to considerations of popularity.
Id. Moreover, throughout history the bench has recognized the idea of judicial necessity.
For example, in 1870, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania noted that "where no provision
is made for calling another in, or where no one else can take his place-it is his duty to
hear and decide, however disagreeable it may be." Philadelphia v. Fox, 64 Pa. 169, 185
(1870); see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803).
108. Williams, 535 U.S. at 919 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 919-20. Additionally, Justice Breyer noted that "[tlhe Compensation
Clause ...is not concerned with the absolute level of judicial compensation," and
therefore the true issue in Williams was whether "a congressional decision in 1989 ...
protect[ed] federal judges against undue diminishment in real pay by providing cost-of-
living adjustments to guarantee that their salaries would not fall too far behind inflation."
Id. at 920.
Similarly, while many Americans consider judicial salaries to be at the high-end of the
spectrum, General William Suter, Clerk of the Supreme Court, explains that most judges
are not "doing this for the money," and that "many judges leave the courtroom, take off
their robes, put on an old sweater with a hole in it, get in an old car and drive home, just
like anybody else." Interview with General William K. Suter, supra note 100.
110. Brief of the American Bar Ass'n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners,
Williams, 535 U.S. 911 (No. 01-175); Brief Amicus Curiae of the American College of
Trial Lawyers in Support of Petitioners, supra note 41; Brief Amici Curiae of National,
State and Local Bar Ass'ns in Support of Petitioners, Williams, 535 U.S. 911 (No. 01-175).
Participating bar associations included: Boston Bar Association, Connecticut Bar
Association, Federal Bar Council, Los Angeles County Bar Association, New York
County Lawyers' Association, Philadelphia Bar Association, Chicago Bar Association,
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hear Williams in order to resolve the ongoing judicial compensation
gridlock. "
E. Stage III: Post-September 11 Attempts at Reform
Prior to September 11, it appeared that significant compensation
reform may occur. The 106th Congress doubled the President's salary
from $200,000 to $400,000, indicating a potential openness for the re-
evaluation of compensation of other high-level government employees.112
But the repercussions of September 11 changed the focus of the nation to
urgent matters of national security."3 As a result, attention to judicial
compensation reform decreased as the demands of the war on terror
quickly gained priority."
4
Judicial compensation again received publicity in 2003 with the
establishment of the "Volcker Commission.""' Congress established this
commission to reexamine the state of public service opportunities and
Federal Bar Association, Illinois State Bar Association, The Association of the Bar of the
City of New York, Ohio State Bar Association, and The Bar Association of San Francisco.
Brief Amici Curiae of National, State and Local Bar Ass'ns in Support of Petitioners,
supra, at 1. With the ABA's membership reaching over 400,000, the membership of the
conglomeration of state and local bar associations reaching over 250,000 members, and the
American College of Trial Lawyers' invitation-only membership of exceptional trial
lawyers, these groups represent a substantial portion of the nation's legal community.
Brief of the American Bar Ass'n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, supra, at 1;
Brief Amicus Curiae of the American College of Trial Lawyers in Support of Petitioners,
supra note 41, at 1; Brief Amici Curiae of National, State and Local Bar Ass'ns in Support
of Petitioners, supra, at 1.
111. Brief of the American Bar Ass'n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners,
supra note 110, at 1-2 (attempting to "assist the Court in understanding the profound
impact of continuing erosion of the compensation of federal judges"); Brief Amicus
Curiae of the American College of Trial Lawyers in Support of Petitioners, supra note 41,
at 1-2 (presenting policy considerations pertaining to the diminution of judicial salaries);
Brief Amici Curiae of National, State and Local Bar Ass'ns in Support of Petitioners
supra note 110, at 1-2 (representing the bar because of the "damage caused to a
independent judiciary by inadequate compensation and the demoralizing effect of a
diminishment of compensation of federal judges").
112. Treasury Department Appropriations Act, 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-58, § 644(a), 113
Stat. 430, 478 (1999) (codified as amended in 3 U.S.C. § 102 (2000)); See also Brian Friel,
Where Things Stand, GOVEXEC.COM, Feb. 1, 2001, http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/
0201/020101pb.htm (posted Feb. 1, 2001) (noting that at the time "[f]ederal executives and
judges are among those hoping that the new presidential salary will bolster their efforts to
convince Congress to increase their pay").
113. America Remembers, CNN.coM, http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2002/america.
remembers/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2006).
114. AM. BAR ASS'N & FED. BAR AW'N, supra note 2, at 2.
115. Id. at 2 n.5. (explaining that the Volcker Commission is a non-partisan
organization of several former government leaders and is formally called the National
Commission on the Public Service).
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compensation. 1 6 The Volcker Commission determined that "[]udicial
salaries are the most egregious example of the failure of federal
compensation policies. Echoing the sentiment of the Volcker
Commission, the American Bar Association (ABA) and Federal Bar
Association (FBA) also published a "white paper" in 2003 detailing the
urgent need for judicial compensation reform. 18 The white paper
received considerable attention from members of the judiciary, including
former Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Kennedy, Justice Scalia, and
Justice Breyer. " 9
These actions within the judicial community spurred Congress to
reconsider judicial compensation reform. On May 7, 2003, Senator Orrin
Hatch introduced a bill supporting a 16.5% increase in judicial salaries
for all Article III, bankruptcy, and magistrate judges. 2" The following
week Representatives Henry Hyde and John Conyers introduced
identical legislation in the House of Representatives.12' Senator Hatch's
bill received approval from the Senate Judiciary Committee in late May
2003, and it was added to Senate Bill 1585, an appropriations bill for
Commerce, Justice, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies. 122 Senate Bill
1585 was then incorporated into a conference report, 23 at which point the
judicial pay provisions were eliminated as part of a compromise between
the House and Senate.124 Although judicial compensation reform wasultimately unsuccessful, the issue received significant attention from
116. Id. at 2.
117. NAT'L COMM'N ON THE PUB. SERV., supra note 13, at 22.
118. See AM. BAR Ass'N & FED. BAR ASS'N, supra note 2.
119. See Walsh, supra note 1. The ABAIFBA white paper was released during a press
conference at the Supreme Court, attended by former Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justices
Scalia, Souter, and Breyer, the President of the American Bar Association, and the
President of the Federal Bar Association. Id.
120. S. 1023, 108th Cong. (2003). Senators Harry Reid and Patrick Leahy also
introduced bills to raise judicial salaries in 2003, but neither bill received bipartisan
support, or the support of President Bush. American Bar Association, Independence of
the Judiciary: Judicial Resources: Judicial Compensation and Court Funding,
http://www.abanet.org/poladv/priorities/udicial-pay.html (last modified Apr. 13, 2005).
Senator Reid's bill, S. 1100, 108th Cong. (2003), called for a twenty-five percent increase in
judicial salaries to effectively close the salary gap created by inflation since 1969. Id.
Senator Leahy's bill, S. 787, 108th Cong. (2003), provided for a six percent raise while
adding additional restrictions onto judges' attendance of educational seminars. Id.
121. H.R. 2118, 108th Cong. (2003).
122. S. 1585, 108th Cong. § 305 (2004).
123. H.R. 2673, 108th Cong. (2004).
124. See Am. Bar Ass'n, supra note 120, at 3-4.
2006]
Catholic University Law Review
Congress and the press. 125 Federal judges also received pay increases in
2004, 2005, and 2006.126
II. A BROKEN SYSTEM: A LOOK AT THE UNRESOLVED ISSUES
SURROUNDING JUDICIAL COMPENSATION AND THE COMPENSATION
CLAUSE
A. Remaining Legal Issues
The United States Constitution establishes that all judges "shall"
receive "at stated Times" compensation "which shall not be diminished
during the Continuance in Office."'27 Because this language is anchored
by the text of the Constitution and supported by the debates and
comments of the Framers, 12 strong binding authority supports it.1
29
However, differing interpretations of the text of the Compensation
Clause have historically led to conflict between the judiciary and
Congress as to the limitations Congress may place on judicial
• 130
compensation.
Williams posed the most recent debate over a potential violation of the
Compensation Clause.13 1 In Williams, the concept of "vesting" supports
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit's holding that
Congress' denial of judicial COLAs was not a violation of the
Compensation Clause. 32 Therefore, each COLA does not vest until the
first day of the applicable fiscal year, allowing Congress to deny COLA
adjustments as long as it passes the appropriate legislation before the
vesting date.1 33 Because the Supreme Court denied certiorari in 2002, the
125. See Walsh, supra note 1.
126. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 19.
127. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
128. E.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 79 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 17, at 400.
129. E.g., Williams v. United States, 535 U.S. 911 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
130. See Vermeule, supra note 15, at 501-02. Professor Vermeule describes the
inherent conflict between the legislative and judicial branches as created by "structural
tensions between aggrandizement and self-dealing." Id. at 501. He further explains that
[i]f no branch enjoys untrammeled power to set its own compensation, some
institution will necessarily enjoy the power, shared or exclusive, to set its rivals'
most immediate rewards and penalties. Yet institutional arrangements that
avoid the risk of aggrandizement through salary control may well create
unacceptable costs on other dimensions. The most obvious alternative-
diminishing leverage, or protecting independence, by allowing institutions to set
their own compensation -creates the competing risk that members of those
institutions will use the compensation power to engage in self-dealing.
Id. at 502.
131. See Williams v. United States, 240 F.3d 1019, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
132. Id. at 1039-40.
133. Id. at 1039.
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Federal Circuit's holding in Williams stands.3 4  However, the Williams
holding does not resolve all issues surrounding judicial compensation and
the denial of COLAs.'35  Below, this Comment discusses several
Compensation Clause issues that require future clarification.
1. Reconciling Williams with Hatter
Williams must be reconciled with the Supreme Court's decision in
Hatter, issued shortly after the Federal Circuit's decision in Williams.
136
In Hatter, the Court held that while general taxation was permissible
upon the judiciary, the Social Security tax at issue in the case "singl[ed]
out judges for disadvantageous treatment" and, therefore, violated the
Compensation Clause.3 7 Hatter stated that discrimination against judges
does not have to manifest itself through "direct hostility to the Judiciary"
to "intimidate, influence, or punish" judges.3 s Similarly, it is arguable
that the judges in Williams were "singl[ed] out" when Congress expressly
selected the judiciary alone as the group of federal employees to be
denied automatic COLA adjustments during four instances in the
1990s." 9 So even though Congress did not intend to punish the judiciary
in Williams, their actions could still be considered discriminatory, and
thus unconstitutional under Hatter.
40
134. See Williams, 535 U.S. at 911. The Federal Circuit opinion was hesitant to uphold
the narrow interpretation of Will's vesting language. See Williams, 240 F.3d at 1040. The
court noted that it was "profoundly disappointing" to uphold such an inconsistent
compensation system. Id.
135. See Williams, 535 U.S. at 918 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Williams, 240 F.3d at 1040
(Plager, J., dissenting).
136. See United States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557, 557 (2001) (decided on May 21, 2001);
Williams, 240 F.3d at 1019 (decided on February 16, 2001).
137. Hatter, 532 U.S. at 576. Furthermore, the Court rejected the government's
argument in Hatter "that Article III protects judges only against a reduction in stated
salary, not against indirect measures that only reduce take-home pay," because of prior
holdings in O'Malley and Will. Id. at 576-77.
138. Id. at 577. The Court further stated that both direct and indirect diminution of
judiciary salaries is forbidden: "[T]he Compensation Clause offers protections that extend
beyond a legislative effort directly to diminish a judge's pay .... Otherwise a legislature
could circumvent even the most basic Compensation Clause protection by . . . precisely
but indirectly achiev[ing] the forbidden effect." Id. at 569 (citation omitted).
139. See Williams, 535 U.S. at 918-19 (Breyer, J., dissenting). However, the Brief for
the United States in Opposition in Williams argued that the Ethics Act also affected
"[m]embers of Congress and high-level Executive branch officials," so judges were not
entirely singled out. Brief for the United States in Opposition at 21, Williams, 535 U.S.
911 (No. 01-175). Moreover, the government argued that Congress was "entitled" to treat
this group of government officials differently than other government employees. Id.
140. Williams, 535 U.S. at 918-19; Hatter, 532 U.S. at 576. Hatter is important because
it refutes prior interpretations of the Compensation Clause as a strictly bright line rule.
See Martin H. Redish, Federal Judicial Independence: Constitutional and Political
Perspectives, 46 MERCER L. REV. 697, 703 (1995). Before the decision in Hatter, Professor
20061
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2. Expectation Interest
In his Williams dissent from the denial of the petition for certiorari,
Justice Breyer explained that the way the Court frames an issue could
determine whether or not a violation of the Compensation Clause has
occurred.14 ' Justice Breyer stated that the issue in Williams could be
viewed as "whether the 1989 [Ethics Act] statute is sufficiently precise
and definite to have created an 'expectation' that the Compensation
Clause protects., 142 Consequently, it can be argued that the Ethics Act
guarantees COLA adjustments to the judiciary unless a "'national
emergency' or "'serious economic conditions affecting the general
welfare"' comes about and limits salary adjustments according to the
General Schedule. 143 Therefore, there is an expectation by judges that
they will receive a COLA adjustment unless one of these two
circumstances occur.'44 Failure to meet this expectation could cause
further attrition from the bench, or shrink the pool of applicants for
consideration.4 However, because Williams eliminates that expectation,
Redish discussed the application of the Compensation Clause to judicial support services,
such as law clerks and secretaries. Id. He found that the Compensation Clause "does not
extend to nonsalary support services under any circumstances," and that the judiciary is
not even protected against "cuts in support services unambiguously designed as retaliation
for a specific decision or series of decisions in the federal courts." Id. Professor Redish
went on to theorize that the Compensation Clause set out a bright line rule "probably in
an attempt to avoid the very uncertainty and political friction that would plague an inquiry
into the retributive nature of congressional action." Id.
However, this argument runs contrary to the Hatter decision. The Hatter Court stated
that Congress does not have to manifest "direct hostility to the Judiciary" to violate the
Compensation Clause, creating the possibility that an even milder attempt to "punish" the
judiciary could be held unconstitutional. See Hatter, 532 U.S. at 577. The key in applying
this standard in Hatter is discrimination; the judiciary must be singled out as a group. Id. at
576. Professor Redish notes that such an "'antidiscrimination' interpretation of the
Compensation Clause" could result by interpreting the Compensation Clause in much the
same way as the Free Exercise Clause, thus protecting judicial salaries from unintended
discriminatory treatment. Redish, supra, at 706; see also Employment Div., Dep't of
Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79 (1990). Moreover, Professor Redish
acknowledged that "[w]hile the antidiscrimination model appears difficult to reconcile
with the seemingly absolute terms of the Compensation Clause, it might be defended as a
relatively easily applied compromise that fulfills the core independence concerns
underlying the clause." Redish, supra, at 706.
141. Williams, 535 U.S. at 918 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
142. 1d.
143. Id.
144. See id.
145. See Rehnquist, supra note 14; see also Vermeule, supra note 15, at 535.
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individuals must now take this information into account when
considering a federal judgeship. 
46
Under precedent set by Boehner, it appears unlikely that the
expectation argument would prevail. 43  In Boehner, a member of
Congress challenged the Ethics Act COLA mechanism, claiming that it
148
violated the Twenty-seventh Amendment, which states that "no law
varying the compensation . . . shall take effect, until an election of
Representatives shall have intervened."' 49 The United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the Ethics Act COLA did
not violate the Twenty-seventh Amendment.5 The court held that
"assuming . . . the twenty-seventh amendment applies to a law passed
before the amendment was ratified, the COLA provision of the Ethics
Reform Act of 1989 is constitutional because it did not cause any
adjustment to congressional compensation until after the election of 1990
and the seating of the new Congress."'51  Although Boehner is not a
Supreme Court decision, there is again a focus on timing and vesting.52
So it is unlikely that the expectation argument would be successful in
Williams, even if the issue was framed to examine expectation interest.
In addition, it remains unclear why compensation should be defined as
"vested" only when it is "due and payable."'53  Although the Court
feared that holding otherwise would allow the judiciary to "command"
Congress, it ignored the argument that future interests are a property
interest, which could vest upon the statute's enactment.'
54
146. See Vemeule, supra note 15, at 537 (discussing the expectations argument in
Hatter, and noting that any compensation expectation would be revised by candidates for
judgeship after a judicial decision made such limitations clear).
147. See Boehner v. Anderson, 30 F.3d 156, 162-63 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
148. Id. at 158.
149. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVII.
150. Boehner, 30 F.3d at 163.
151. Id. at 162.
152. Id. at 163.
153. United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 228-29 (1980) (defining vesting as due and
payable); see Williams v. United States, 240 F.3d 1019, 1039 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (defining
vesting as due and payable); Vermeule, supra note 15, at 525 ("[T]he Will Court never
quite gives a reason, or a valid reason" for deciding upon this characterization of
"vesting.").
154. See Will, 449 U.S. at 228; Vermeule, supra note 15, at 525. To clarify, the reason
why vesting remains at issue is that
if the vesting rule provided that increases vest at the time of enactment then the
intent would be, not merely announced for the future, but accomplished in the
present, just as entering an executory contract can bind a party now to an
obligation in the future. In that case the decision would, as of the time of
enactment (also the time of vesting), no longer be one that the Constitution
commits exclusively to Congress.
Id. Yet Will refutes the future interests argument asserted by Petitioners in Williams:
20061
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The Petitioner's Brief in Williams raised the issue that there is a
significant risk of losing other elements of judicial compensation, such as
retirement benefits, if Congress passed a law that expressed intent in a
previously codified law, and the concept of future interests is not taken
into consideration.'55 Petitioners suggested that Congress may be able to
eliminate judicial retirement benefits prior to a judge's retirement
because "retirement benefits are neither determined nor payable until
the judge retires. 156  Retirement benefits are a significant part of a
judge's compensation package.157 Diminution of such benefits through
judicial interpretation of Will's vesting language presents a serious
concern for judges.5 8  Thus, under the Will test, Congress could
constitutionally revoke judges' retirement benefits if Congress codifies
the legislation prior to the vesting date.'59
B. Prudential Concerns
In addition to interpreting the language of the Compensation Clause,
the nature of the judiciary as an independent, non-political branch of
government adds additional complexity to the resolution of the judicial
compensation issue.61 Justice Breyer admittedly acknowledged that
granting certiorari in Williams would create the "serious embarrassment
of deciding a matter that would directly affect our own pocketbooks.'
16
'
By determining its own compensation, the Court would create a delicate
situation that "may risk the public's high opinion of the Court insofar as
that opinion rests upon a belief that its judges are not self-interested.' 62
The Court's decision in Will... did not use the term 'vest' in that technical sense,
based on arcane principles governing future interests. To the contrary, the Court
plainly used the word "vest" in Will as a shorthand to state the constitutional rule
that judicial salary increases become irrevocable only once they take effect.
Brief for the United States in Opposition, supra note 139, at 17-18.
155. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 89, at 10.
156. Id.
157. See 28 U.S.C. § 371 (b)-(c) (2000).
158. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 89, at 10-11.
159. See id. at 12.
160. Williams v. United States, 535 U.S. 911, 919 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
161. Id.
162. Id. Professor Vermeule agrees that the Compensation Clause
doctrine should be restructured to take into account the ... risk of judicial self-
dealing that arises when judge-plaintiffs file suits to increase their compensation,
suits that are heard by judge-adjudicators who have a direct or indirect financial
interest in the proceedings and who would be disqualified from sitting, were it
not that no alternative adjudicator is available.
Vermeule, supra note 15, at 504.
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Arguably, Congress is in the same uncomfortable situation in making
decisions regarding its own compensation. 163 The Constitution explicitly
states that Congress alone has the ability to appropriate funds.'
64
Therefore, the legislative branch receives both the benefits, and possible
burdens, of such a power. 165 The judicial branch, however, was designed
to be an independent, apolitical mechanism.'66 The Rule of Necessity
may require a self-interested judiciary to decide a case where "'no
provision is made for calling another in, or where no one else can take his
place.",167 But Congress can help the judiciary resolve the dispute over
judicial compensation. Congress is in no way precluded from acting on
the judiciary's behalf; in fact, such actions are fully within Congress'
power.M Another branch of government suggesting the increase would
mitigate concerns about the public's perception of judicial self-interest.1
61
However, in his dissent from the denial of the petition for certiorari in
Williams, Justice Breyer noted Congress' lack of inclination to resolve
the judicial compensation issuer. Justice Breyer noted that Congress
163. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 6-7.
164. Id. Article I, Section 7 states: "All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the
House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on
other Bills." Id.
165. See id.
166. See Redish, supra note 140, at 697. The author explains that the Constitution set
out to create "pragmatic balances" between the legislative and judicial branches:
On the one hand, the Constitution's framers consciously chose to insulate
members of the federal judiciary from at least the most acute forms of potential
political pressure by expressly providing for the protection of their salary and
tenure. On the other hand, the framers simultaneously provided the groundwork
to facilitate the exercise of seemingly substantial congressional control of the
jurisdiction of the federal courts, thereby potentially undermining the very
independence expressly provided to the judges of those courts.
Id. at 697-98 (footnote omitted).
167. Williams, 535 U.S. at 919 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Will,
449 U.S. 200, 214 (1980)).
168. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. Furthermore, Congress' insistence on tying its own
COLA to those of the apolitical judicial branch may be part of the dilemma. According to
the Brief of the American Bar Association
[t]he crux of the problem is congressionally-imposed linkage of judicial
salaries protected by Article III with other salaries- particularly those of
members of Congress-that do not enjoy such constitutional protection. Thus,
federal judges have borne the consequences of the political reluctance of
Congress to increase its own pay, or even to accept previously mandated
COLAs.
Brief of The American Bar Ass'n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, supra note
110, at 5.
169. See Vermeule, supra note 15, at 501-02.
170. See Williams, 535 U.S. at 919-20 (Breyer, J., dissenting). In fact, Congress is not
constitutionally obligated to make adjustments to judicial salaries because "as long as
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passed blocking laws "about half the time" since the Ethics Act was
enacted and that "real salaries of district court judges have declined
about 25 percent in the past several decades. 171  Therefore, Justice
Breyer seemed to suggest that if reform were to take place, it would
likely be up to the judiciary to take the necessary steps.172
As of October 2004, these concerns appear justified. Both houses of
Congress considered legislation authorizing increases in judicial salaries
for all Article III, bankruptcy, and magistrate judges, 173 but no significant
reform became law. 174 Nevertheless, federal judges did receive increases
from 2004 though 2006.175 At best, it appears that Congress continues to
operate under an inconsistent, sporadic model of compensation
adjustments and COLA allocations. 176
Congress has not reduced judicial salaries, the Compensation Clause is neutral toward
congressional action, even when that action may actually undermine judicial
independence." Redish, supra note 140, at 701-02.
171. Williams, 535 U.S. at 919-20 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
172. See id. In addition, there is no longer a debate as to the permanency of Section
140 or the clarity of its language; Congress is not "obligated to expend or increase" judicial
salaries "except as may be specifically authorized by Act of Congress." 28 U.S.C. § 461
note (2000) (Specific Congressional Authorization Required for Salary Increases for
Federal Judges and Justices of the Supreme Court). The previous discrepancy was
resolved in Williams when the Federal Circuit definitively held that Section 140 was no
longer good law because, as written, it was only intended to remain viable through the
1982 fiscal year. Williams v. United States, 240 F.3d 1019, 1026-27 (Fed. Cir. 2001); see
also Williams, 535 U.S. at 918-19 (Breyer, J., dissenting). In response, the 107th Congress
reenacted Section 140, including explicit language that the provision was permanent,
binding law. See Judiciary Appropriations Act, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-77, § 305, 115 Stat.
780, 783 (2001) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.A. § 461 note (West Supp. 2005) (Salary
Adjustments for Justices and Judges).
The reinstitution of Section 140, however, creates ambiguity in terms of Congress'
likelihood to increase judicial salaries in the future because additional barriers prohibit the
automatic disbursement of COLAs as originally stated under the Ethics Act. See
Williams, 535 U.S. at 919-20 (Breyer, J., dissenting). This relates to Justice Breyer's
concern in Williams, that Congress has often passed blocking laws while real judicial
salaries have been decreasing. Id. Therefore, although Section 140 is now clearly good
law, the likelihood of receiving automatic COLAs based on the ECI appears no more
likely, and is perhaps more unlikely, than it was prior to the Federal Circuit Court's
decision in Williams. See id.; see also Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 75, at 1.
173. See supra text accompanying note 120.
174. See supra text accompanying note 125.
175. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 19.
176. See id.
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III. COMMENT: POTENTIAL JUDICIAL COMPENSATION REFORM
SOLUTIONS
A. Breaking the COLA Link
In 2003, the ABA and FBA recommended judicial compensation
reforms to the 108th Congress through a joint white paper. 17' The white
paper proposed raising base salaries "to restore denied Employment
Cost Index adjustments for fiscal years 1995-97 and 1999,',17 as detailed
in Williams,17 and to "ensure [judicial salaries have a] reasonable
relationship with salaries of professionals in comparable jobs."'' ° The
ABA and FBA also suggested eliminating the link between judicial and
congressional COLAs through an amendment to the Ethics Act.81 '
As stated above, however, specific congressional proposals for reform
fizzled.' 82 Therefore, it appears that Congress seeks to maintain the
status quo-periodic allotments of COLAs while maintaining control to
reverse its decisions as desired.
183
The idea of providing judges with automatic COLAs began with the
Ethics Act.' 8M Since 1989, however, Congress has passed a series of
blocking laws, essentially converting these "automatic" adjustments into
177. AM. BARASS'N &FED. BAR ASS'N, supra note 2, at i.
178. Id. at 24.
179. See Williams v. United States, 535 U.S. 911, 911 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(discussing petitioners' arguments for reinstating COLAs for 1995-1997 and 1999 due to
unconstitutional blocking laws).
180. AM. BAR Ass'N & FED. BAR ASS'N, supra note 2, at 24.
181. Id. This would entail repealing Section 140, so as to eliminate any specific
requirement for congressional approval of COLAs for federal judges. Id. The white
paper also suggested reinstating an advisory body similar to the Quadrennial Commission
to provide a continual reevaluation of federal pay rates. Id.
182. See discussion supra notes 117-22 and accompanying text.
183. See Judiciary Appropriations Act, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-77, § 305, 115 Stat. 780,
783 (2001) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.A. § 461 note (West Supp. 2005) (Salary
Adjustments for Justices and Judges)). Section 140 was redrafted and codified in 2001, see
id., and the vesting language established in Will and interpreted in Williams ensures that
such a provision is permissible in terms of the Compensation Clause, see Williams v.
United States, 240 F.3d 1019, 1029-30 (Fed. Cir. 2001). However, the Petitioner in
Williams argued that the interpretation of "vesting" was misguided, in that
if the Will court had intended to hold that only current salary is protected, it
would not have gone to the effort of analyzing the 1975 Act to determine
whether that Act actually fixed salaries or was merely a "method" for doing so.
Under the panel majority's reading of Will, this analysis was a meaningless
exercise. The Court could simply have said that legislatively-mandated salary
increases are not protected until actually possessed.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 89, at 28 (citation omitted).
184. See AM. BAR ASS'N & FED. BAR ASS'N, supra note 2, at 9.
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discretionary payments. 115 Behind these discretionary payments is an
unnecessary linkage between congressional COLAs and judicial
COLAs. 186 This connection should be severed through an amendment to
the Ethics Act in order to eliminate unnecessary political game-playing.'87
There are three main reasons why the congressional-judicial COLA
connection need not exist. First, the Ethics Act's sole condition for
denial of judicial COLAs is a situation involving a national fiscal crisis,
thus creating an expectation interest for judges that they will receive
COLAs unless this condition occurs. 118 In addition to an expectation
analysis, a Hatter discriminatory analysis could result in a holding that
the isolation of the judiciary is unconstitutional. 9
Second, judicial salaries make up only a tiny part of the national
budget.' 9° Had judges received COLA adjustments in 1995, 1996, 1997,
and 1999, as disputed in Williams, there would have been a 9.40%
increase in judicial salaries."' The effect of this salary increase would
have accounted for "less than 0.00012% of the 2001 [fiscal year] total
federal budget, and only about 0.009% of the federal budget dedicated to
the administration of justice.', 192 Considering these statistics, aside from
times of extreme fiscal national distress, judicial COLA adjustments will
only have a negligible effect on the total outlays of the federal
government.
Third, COLAs are commonly understood to be a mechanism used to
maintain the purchasing power of an individual's salary over time.93
Many Americans receive similar adjustments in pay,' 94 and it is feasible
that the general public would accept judges receiving the same increase
as any other federal government employee.
185. See Williams v. United States, 535 U.S. 911, 913 (2002) (Breyer J., dissenting);
infra Part III.C. (describing the historically inconsistent disbursement of COLAs to the
judiciary).
186. AM. BAR ASS'N & FED. BAR ASS'N, supra note 2, at i.
187. See id. at 24.
188. See Williams, 535 U.S. at 916 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing expectation
interest).
189. See id. at 918-19.
190. See Brief of National, State and Local Bar Ass'ns in Support of Petitioners, supra
note 110, at 19-20.
191. Id. at 20.
192. Id.
193. See, e.g., Social Security Checks To Increase Next Year, SEATrLE TIMES, Oct. 20,
2004, at A4 (announcing a 2.7% COLA increase for all Social Security check recipients).
194. E.g., Office of Pers. Mgmt., January 2006 Cost-of-Living Adjustment,
http://www.opm.gov/retire/html/faqs/2006cola.asp (last visited Feb. 24, 2006); Soc. Sec.
Online, Cost-of-Living Adjustment, http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/COLA/colasummary.html
(last visited October 10, 2004).
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B. Alternative Solutions
To uphold the meaning of the Compensation Clause, preserve
expectation interests, and protect against discrimination, Congress
should amend the Ethics Act to separate the allotments of judicial
COLAs from congressional COLAs. 95 By taking such actions, Congress
would strengthen and preserve judicial independence-a fundamental
constitutional principle identified by the Framers.'
9 6
Congress must also address the judiciary's existing salary gap. But how
much of a salary increase is enough? If salaries increased ten percent, or
even fifty percent, would that increase the likelihood of recruiting more
qualified judges, preventing fewer early retirements, and creating a
higher quality of jurisprudence? 197 The Compensation Clause plainly
states that Congress may not diminish compensation, but it does not
require Congress to increase compensation in any way.' 9 Additionally,
at a time when America is losing jobs 99 and facing a growing deficit,2°° it
would be politically unpopular to recommend a significant compensation
increase for a group of individuals whose salaries already surpass that of
most Americans.' ° 1
Thus, despite the constitutional, prudential, and equitable arguments
in favor of judicial compensation reform, political realities may make it
unrealistic to expect Congress to end the gridlock.2 °2 Therefore, it is
crucial to consider alternative, creative solutions that could potentially
mitigate the adverse impact of such gridlock on the quality and future
attractiveness of the federal judiciary.
195. In doing so, Congress should also repeal Section 140. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 461 note
(West Supp. 2005) (Salary Adjustments for Justices and Judges).
196. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 17, at 397.
197. See Rehnquist, supra note 14. But see Yoon, supra note 17, at 1030.
198. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
199. See, e.g., Eric Chabrow, IT Jobs Continue To Disappear, INFORMATIONWEEK,
July 28, 2004, http://www.informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articlelD=
26100484.
200. Jonathan Weisman, The Budget Deficit and How it Grew, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct.
11, 2004, at A3.
201. See Geraghty, supra note 17.
202. See Light, supra note 36, at 86. The author noted that
[t]he [income] gaps are particularly hard on the federal judiciary, where
Congress has gotten into the habit of denying federal judges the annual cost-of-
living increases prescribed by law. As a result, federal district and circuit court
judges have lost almost 25 percent in purchasing power to inflation since 1969,
while Supreme Court justices have lost 38 percent (more than half of that since
1993).
Id. Furthermore, General Suter, the Clerk of the Supreme Court, stated that the only
reason Congress would reform judicial compensation would be because of "pangs of
conscience." Interview with General William K. Suter, supra note 100.
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First, Congress could enact legislation that vests retirement benefits for
federal judges after a short time on the bench, with assurances that
retirement benefits will never be reduced by a "blocking law" or other
means.2 03  In light of the Will vesting test, some creative, technical
drafting would be required to ensure that retirement benefits vestedquickly204 While this action would not address the present cash flow
dilemma of sitting judges, future judicial nominees may be less
apprehensive about accepting positions on the bench, thereby providing
an important incentive to make the pay sacrifice inherent in accepting a
judgeship.
Second, reflecting the actions taken for federal executive branch
employees a few years ago, Congress could enact legislation that will
provide locality pay adjustments for federal judges.' °6 Many observers,
however, sincerely believe that federal judges in their areas simply do not
need a pay increase and that qualified and diverse people are lining up
for appointments to the bench.2 W Others assert that judges are not
203. Congress could vest these retirement rights after three years, which is the amount
of time it takes for government employees' to vest in the TSP. See TSP Features for
Civilians, supra note 27.
204. See United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 228-29 (1980); Williams v. United States,
240 F.3d 1019, 1039 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
205. Cf Vermeule, supra note 15, at 535-36.
206. Light, supra note 36, at 86 (explaining that "Congress has refused to give judges
the same local cost-of-living adjustments that help federal civil servants in high-cost cities
such as New York, Boston, San Francisco and Los Angeles. Although the Constitution
expressly prohibits Congress from cutting the salaries of judges, its inaction has done just
that").
207. E.g., Posting of Gary Ruskin to Senate, "Graft for Judges" Provision Threatens
Corruption of Federal Judiciary, (Sept. 14, 2000), http://lists.essential.org/pipermaillcong-
reform/2000/000004.html, (asking for support against a proposed year 2000 pay raise for
federal judges, declaring "[f]ederal judges are already overpaid. They neither need a pay
raise nor honoraria"). Others argue that Congress continues to mount opposition to
judicial pay raises because "judicial salaries are still well above the median income of most
Americans." Geraghty, supra note 17.
Some judges and judicial scholars express similar sentiments. A California Law Review
article quoted Judge Posner explaining that the difference between judges and associates
in private law firms is that associates "'work like dogs, and most federal judges do not."'
Yoon, supra note 17, at 1041 (quoting RICHARD A. POSNER, FEDERAL COURTS:
CHALLENGE AND REFORM 385-90 (1996)). The same article quoted judicial scholar
Pamela Karlan as saying "notwithstanding the fairness concerns underlying federal judicial
compensation, 'it would be ludicrous to suggest that current judicial salaries pose any sort
of structural threat to judicial independence."' Id. (quoting Pamela S. Karlan, Two
Concepts of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L.REV. 535, 538 (1998)).
Similarly, Professor Vermeule argued that raising salaries is not always the solution,
and that a slightly lower salary may actually attract individuals who derive "intrinsic
satisfaction" from public service. Vermeule, supra note 15, at 536. Moreover, Professor
Vermeule explained that there is a scale from which to view this tradeoff where
"excessively low compensation might produce a cadre of insufficiently talented amateur
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actually leaving the bench because of their decreasing salaries. 20,
Yet certain high-cost areas pose a unique problem to generalized
conclusions about the adequacy of judicial compensation. 9 Locality pay
adjustment would recognize that the same salary does not create the
same purchasing power or standard of living in New York City as it does
in Omaha, Nebraska.2 10 This proposal would result in actual cash flow
benefits for members of the judiciary who need it most, without Congress• • • 211
swallowing across-the-board pay increases for the judiciary.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Compensation Clause, as interpreted in recent case law, does not
require Congress to ensure that automatic COLA increases will take
effect in the future, as long as blocking laws are passed prior to the
vesting date. However, there are constitutional, legal, and political
arguments in favor of creating more stable and consistent judicial
COLAs, and decreasing the inflationary gap in judicial salaries. But
these substantial reforms may not be realistic in today's political
environment. Congress should consider addressing judicial
compensation with imaginative new proposals from a more indirect
angle, such as protecting future retirement benefits by vesting them
earlier and providing locality pay. Prompt congressional action is
necessary to reform a system that consistently fails to protect the third
co-equal branch of government as an independent judiciary.
enthusiasts, but excessively high compensation might produce a cadre of talented but
venal opportunists." Id. This perspective arises from theories regarding the role of
salaries and the motivation for corruption of public officials. JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 431-432, (Carolina
Academic Press 1987) (1833); see James D. Fearon, Electoral Accountability and the
Control of Politicians: Selecting Good Types Versus Sanctioning Poor Performance, in
DEMOCRACY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND REPRESENTATION 55,61 (Adam Przeworski et al.
eds., 1999); Saul Levmore, Voting with Intensity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 111, 115 n.7 (2000).
208. Yoon, supra note 17, at 1030.
209. See Light, supra note 36, at 86.
210. E.g., J. SCOT MOODY & DAVID K. HOFFMAN, TAX. FOUND., NO. 125, SPECIAL
REPORT: FEDERAL INCOME TAXES AND THE COST OF LIVING 2-7 (2003),
http://www.taxfoundation.org/files/0385ff418f81ca2b8fe05d52c7f30a7e.pdf (explaining, for
example, that as of 2003, "[a]n income of $132,143 in San Francisco, California, yields the
same standard of living as $84,111 in Portland, Oregon .... or $70,772 in Phoenix,
Arizona.").
211. Cf id.
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